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AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CUBA AND THE
RULE OF LAW
By RICHARD A. FALx*
With regard to human affairs-not to laugh, not to cry,
not to become indignant, but to understand.
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA
I. THE COLD WAR AND THE RULE OF LAW
The United States sponsorship of the unsuccessful rebel invasion
of Cuba in April 1961 has temporarily climaxed the steady deteriora-
tion of Cuban-American relations that has taken place since the advent
of Castro on January 1, 1959. This article makes a provisional inter-
pretation of these events, emphasizing their significance for the future
role of law in the resolution of disputes between nations in the Western
Hemisphere.
It may be useful to suggest the broader relevance of the rebel
invasions as an introduction to what intends to be primarily a case
study. It is basic, for instance, to understand the extent to which the
Cold War influences the formation of national policy in a situation in
which our leaders regard political considerations as conflicting with
legal commitments.
It is quite evident that United States hostility to Castro was
premised upon the assumption that Cuba had become, for practical
purposes, a Communist nation closely allied with the Soviet power
bloc. As such, Cuba had switched sides in the Cold War1 and had
established in the hemisphere a Communist beachhead of enormous
psychological, if not political, potency.' This was regarded as endan-
gering hemispheric solidarity and stability, as well as opening the
way for Communist expansion in Latin America. Does the pressure
of the Cold War make it legitimate for the United States to act with-
out legal restraint in relation to Castro's Cuba? This somewhat over-
states the critical issue raised, it seems to me, by American inter-
ventionary conduct in the internal affairs of Cuba. It points, however,
to the dilemma created for American policy-makers.
* Associate Professor, College of Law, Ohio State University.
1 Schwarzenberger, "Hegemonial Intervention," 18 YB World Affairs 236, 261-263
(1959).
2 See e.g., Mills, Listen Yankee, 179-182, 187-189 (1960); Fitzgibbon, "The
Revolution Next Door: Cuba," 334 Annals 113, 120-121 (1961); Berle, "The Cuban
Crisis," 39 Foreign Aff. 40 (1960); Wymberley, "Forces of Change in Latin America,"
44 Dep't. State Bull. 251, 253 (1961); Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba, Anatomy of a
Revolution, 145-157 (1961); Draper, "Cubans and Americans," 94 Encounter 59 (1961).
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For the urgency of the Cold War must be balanced against the
advocacy by the United States of the rule of law in world affairs.'
Senator Warren Magnuson expressed our national sense of mission
when he said that "I have long felt that the United States ... should
stimulate among all nations a dependence upon the rule of law in
international dealings."14 And almost without exception our national
leaders have urged that law represents the one alternative to force in
international relations.' For example, in 1947 Senator Robert Taft
observed that, "I do not see how we can hope to secure permanent
peace in the world except by establishing law between nations and
equal justice under law."6 And former President Eisenhower in an
important address on the rule of law given in 1959 at New Delhi
suggested that," . . . the time has come for mankind to make the
rule of law in international affairs as normal as it is now in domestic
affairs." There is a widespread awareness that international uses of
force gravely heighten the risks of nuclear catastrophe. This awareness
gives sentiments expressing a plea for adherence to law in world affairs
a relevance to the politics of survival and national interest that was
not present earlier in our history.' The rule of law in world affairs
has today become a serious objective of "practical men." The Cuban
crisis arose from a situation in which the demands of the Cold War
were perceived as conflicting with conduct in accord with the rule
of law. The United States, it would seem, resorted to indirect inter-
vention which was explicitly prohibited by several applicable treaties.9
The strategy of fighting the Cold War was accorded precedence over
legal obligations by leading American policy-makers in both major
political parties. Such a course of national action is part of a more
general trend away from a law-oriented approach to international
affairs by the United States when Cold War issues are presented.
Notable examples are provided by the overthrow of the allegedly
3 Two interesting recent statements are found in Bishop, "The International Rule
of Law," 59 Mich. L. Rev. 553 (1961) and in Douglas, "The Rule of Law in World
Affairs" (1961).
4 Quoted in ABA, Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, Compilation
of Quotations 11 (Jan. 1960).
5 For representative examples see Compilation, op. sit., note 4.
O Id. at 11.
7 Eisenhower, Peace with Justice, 193 (1961).
8 This point is the central point of a paper presented at September 1961 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Falk, Impacts of Revolutionary
Nations Upon the Growth of International Law. See also, Jessup, The Use of Interna-
tional Law, 8-29 (1959); Brown & Real, Community of Fear (1960); Mills, A World
Without War (1961); Millis, Permanent Peace (1961).
9 See infra, Section IV, pp. 37-65, for a detailed argument in support of this con-
clusion.
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pro-Communist Arbenz government in Guatemala in 195410 and the
U-2 incident in 1960.11 Additional conduct by the United States in-
dicates a reluctance to implement our frequent pledges to promote
the growth of world law: retention of the Connally Amendment, a
political approach to the recognition of new goverments (e.g. Peking
China),2 and an unwillingness to seek legal standards in advance of
behavior in connection with the use of espionage satellites in outer
space.'3 This national trend is alarming in view of the choice that
exists between force and law in the conduct of foreign affairs. The
Cuban dispute imposed upon our leaders the burden of choosing
between legal norms and the apparent promotion of the American
position in the Cold War. It is possible, in view of the political
failure of the interventionary tactics, that strict compliance with
law might have maximized the United States' position in the Cold
War; nonintervention in other words, might have been the most
effective way to cut our losses in Latin America as a consequence of
Castro's defection from the West.
The following factors then, seem central to an understanding of
the official United States response to Castro: the use of force is the
alternative to the rule of law; the use of force increases the risk of
nuclear war; legal restraint paralyzes the United States in its effort
to wage the Cold War; national leaders seem influenced more by
Cold War considerations than they do the struggle to extend the
rule of law.
Part of the purpose of this essay is to show that this is a very
dangerous and unnecessary way to comprehend most contemporary
international situations. It is essential that we as a nation discover
the practical value of legal self-restraint and that we find lawful ways
to promote our political interests. For instance, it is essential that
we help, rather than hinder, social revolutions in Latin America so
that radical elites will not be led to the Soviet bloc as the only avail-
able source of support; specifically, Castro might have been allowed
to develop his internal social program in such a way that Cuba would
not have been led to identify with the communist cause in world
affairs, and this might have avoided the pressures that led the United
States to follow a course of dubious legality. A clear distinction be-
10 See Graber, Crisis Diplomacy 243-245 (1959) [hereinafter cited as GRABER];
Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention 297-299 (1956) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS];
Falk, "The United States and the Doctrine of Non-intervention in the Internal Affairs
of Independent States," 5 How. L. 3. 163, 181-183 (1959).
11 Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 836 (1960).
12 Cf., H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947).
13 See report of U.S. position on Samos (espionage satellite) in N.Y. Times, Oct.
11, 1960, p. 12, col. 1.
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tween socialism and communism might help us to make a more rational
balance between the Cold War and the rule of law. 4
The use of supranational institutions is expected to exert control
upon the conduct of states in the world. However, a further negative
lesson of the Cuban experience is the marginal importance of the
Organization of American States to the United States policy of keeping
communist elites from gaining control of governments in the hemi-
sphere. Although all Latin American countries are willing to condemn
the international communist movement as interventionary when it
extends its activities to the Western Hemisphere, the stronger OAS
nations of South America are unwilling to take collective action to
overthrow such a government by coercion. This unwillingness was
expressed first at Caracas in relation to Guatemala, and more signif-
icantly, throughout the Cuban crisis. The South American states are
more concerned with defending the concept of nonintervention than
with acting jointly to root out communist control. The United States
is strongly disposed to view the need to act against the communist
menace as more pressing than to guard states against intervention.
In fact, the United States has consistently urged at OAS meetings
that collective responsibility was a necessary complement to the re-
nunciation of unilateral intervention as it had been practiced by the
United States during the latter decades of diplomacy under the Monroe
Doctrine. 15 One way, then, to view the Cuban crisis is to regard it as
the American reaction to the failure of the OAS to carry out its
duties of collective action. Such thinking appears to have been dom-
inant in President Kennedy's mind when he said in an important
address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors:
... [L]et the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible.
Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-
interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction-if
the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commit-
ments against outside Communist penetration-then I want it
clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meet-
ing its primary obligations, which are to the security of our
Nation. 16
14 That is, a program of radical social change in the direction of "socialism"
should not necessarily threaten the United States' position in the Cold War. This is
illustrated by the political affiliations of such "socialist" nations as Israel, Uruguay,
and Yugoslavia. In fact, it is felt, that socialism is a stabilizing, Communist-resisting
tendency in the newly developing parts of the world, and should therefore be actively
encouraged by the United States.
15 Miller, "Nonintervention and Collective Responsibility in the Americas," 22
Dep't. of State Bull. 768 (1950).
16 Kennedy, "The Lesson of Cuba," 44 Dep't. State Bull. 659 (1961).
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The significance of this assertion of policy by our President can hardly
be stressed enough. It makes a residual claim to act unilaterally in
the event that the OAS fails to act collectively. It remains to be seen
what the future will hold for this new expression of American foreign
policy (identified here as "The Kennedy Doctrine") in the Western
Hemisphere." It is evident that the United States does not feel that
its national interests in the Cold War are currently protected by the
collective machinery of the OAS. This political conclusion must be
considered in light of the American legal pledge to use the OAS in the
event that coercive action is needed to overcome communist control
in a Latin American country. This represents, then, a second dimension
of the perception by American leaders of the conflict between legal
and political considerations in the Cold War.
The instability created by the Cuban events is further revealed
by the Soviet response. Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet press
emphasized generally the United States role in the violation of Cuban
sovereignty that resulted from the interventionary attempt to over-
throw Castro, But more significant is the stress upon reciprocity in
Premier Khrushchev's Message to President Kennedy on April 22,
1961:
Mr. President, you are taking a very dangerous path. Think about
it. You speak about your rights and obligations. Certainly, every-
one can have pretensions to these rights or those rights, but then
you must also permit other states to base their acts in analogous
instances on the same kind of reasons and considerations.' 8
If the United States can intervene to counteract the danger of Soviet
domination in Cuban affairs, certainly then, the United States is
foreclosed from objecting if the Soviet Union intervenes in Turkish
or Pakistani affairs to thwart American domination. Khrushchev put
it this way:
You declare that Cuba is allegedly able to use its territory for acts
against the United States. This is your assumption, and it is not
based on any facts. We, however . . . are able now to refer to
concrete facts and not to assumptions: In some countries border-
ing directly on the Soviet Union . . . there are governments which
have put their territory at its [the United States] disposal to
accommodate American military bases there.
17 It may not contribute a new operating policy to governmental relations in the
hemisphere, especially in view of the Cuban mishap. Thus the Kennedy Doctrine might
amount to no more than an ad hoc formulation made under the pressure of events.
It was part of an address made while the Cuban invasion was still going on.
18 "Mr. Khrushchev to President Kennedy," (unofficial translation of message date
April 22, 1961), reprinted in 44 Dep't. State Bull. 664, 665 (1961).
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The conclusion is then deftly drawn:
If you consider yourself to be in the right to implement such
measures against Cuba which have been lately taken by the United
States of America, you must admit that other countries, also, do not
have lesser reason to act in a similar manner in relation to states
on whose territories preparations are actually being made which
represent a threat against the security of the Soviet Union. If you
do not wish to sin against elementary logic, you evidently must
admit such a right to other states.19
I have quoted from Khrushchev's response at this length because
it seems to touch so directly upon the role of law in the context of the
Cold War-namely, to specify mutual limits upon national behavior
so as to prevent outbreaks of international violence. Khrushchev's argu-
ment is based upon the idea that minimum world order arises from
reciprocal self-restraint on the part of states in the world, and that
this order depends upon mutuality of compliance. If one nation exceeds
the prevailing limit, then it licenses other nations to do the same thing.
This is a distinctive quality of the law-behavior of a decentralized
political order in which power is horizontally" distributed. Contrast
the domestic vertical order in which a violation of a legal standard
by one citizen leads the state to impose direct, coercive sanctions
upon the violator. There is no general notion in domestic society
that because others violate the law, say against homicide or rape, I
am entitled to do the same; however, a vertical order occasionally
behaves like a horizontal order, as when it enacts widely unpopular
laws. Reciprocity undermined the usual fidelity of Americans to law
during the prohibition era. In contrast, a horizontal order will behave
like a vertical legal order if an overwhelming consensus favors the
enforcement of a legal rule against a violator; this is one way to
examine the effectiveness of the response in the United States to the
Suez invasion initiated by France, Great Britain, and Israel in 1956.1
Generally, however, the international legal- order depends on the hori-
zontal restraints imposed by considerations of reciprocity if it is to
be effective.
President Kennedy seemed to hint that the Soviet intervention
of 1956 in Hungary was a horizontal precedent for prospective Amer-
ican intervention in Cuba when he said:
Should that time come [for an American intervention] we do not
19 Ibid.
20 Falk, "International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal
Order," 32 Temp. L.Q. 295 (1959).
21 Falk, "Jurisdiction, Immunities and Act of State: Suggestions for a Modified Ap-
proach," Essays on International Jurisdiction (1961).
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intend to be lectured on "intervention" by those whose character
was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest. 2s
This accords with the logic of reciprocity, but it should be noted that
the Soviet action in Hungary, bloody as it was, did not involve border-
crossing (Soviet forces were lawfully present in Hungary), nor did
it involve an effort to overthrow a legitimate and functioning gov-
ernment.
It should be observed, furthermore, that the United Nations did
not provide very strong vertical direction in the Cuban crisis. Premier
Khrushchev in his April 22nd Message to President Kennedy said:
I wish to stress that if the United Nations is destined to attain true
strength and fulfill the functions for which it was created ... then
the United Nations must resolutely condemn the warlike actions
against Cuba.2 3
Regardless of how one interprets the Cuban invasion, it is clear that
a Member of the Organization was subject to an armed attack across
its borders, which was facilitated by the willingness of other countries
to give their support to enemies of the legitimate government. In the
face of such coercive violation of Cuban sovereignty the United Nations
did no more than to pass a Seven-Power Resolution that expressed
deep concern and "exhorted all Member States to take such peaceful
action as is open to them to remove existing tension."24 A somewhat
stronger Mexican Draft Resolution which obtained a 41-35 majority,
failed of adoption because it did not obtain a necessary two-thirds
majority in the General Assembly. It called upon all States "to seek
the pacific settlement of disputes" and went on as follows:
1. Makes an urgent appeal to all States to ensure that their terri-
tories and resources are not used to promote a civil war in Cuba;
2. Urges them to put an immediate end to any activity that might
result in further bloodshed;
3. Requests them to cooperate, in keeping with the spirit of the
Charter, in the search for a peaceful solution to the present
situation 5
The refusal of many nations to vote for the Mexican Resolution
indicates the inadequacy of the protection that will be given to an
unpopular small state that is the target of aggression; this further
underscores the dependence of nations upon the horizontal controls
22 Kennedy, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 659.
23 Khrushchev, op. cit. supra, note 18, at 665.
24 U.N. Doe. A/C.1/L275; adopted in plenary session April 21, 1961 by a vote of
59 (including U.S.) to 13, with 24 abstentions.
25 U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L275; the vote in plenary session was 41 to 35 (including the
U.S.), with 20 abstentions; the resolution failed of adoption as it lacked the necessary
two-thirds majority.
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over force in international relations, especially when border-crossing (as
distinct from internal civil strife) is involved.
This general introduction seeks to establish a background apt for
an inquiry into the circumstances that led up to, and the legal status
and implications of, the rebel invasion of Cuba in April 1961. It seems
desirable to begin by a summary depiction of the role of the United
States in pre-Castro Cuba. For the post-Castro development cannot
be appreciated without some awareness of the historical and socio-
economic involvement of the United States in Cuban affairs since the
beginning of the nineteenth century.
II. PRE-CASTRO CUBAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
A. United States and Colonial Cuba (1498-1898)
The modern history of Cuba commences with its discovery by
Columbus in 1492, and its subsequent colonization by Spain. 6 Until
the nineteenth century Cuba was valuable to Spain mainly as a stra-
tegic naval base. Throughout this period it was a source of concern
to the leading maritime powers in the Caribbean as its natural harbors
served so well the needs of pirates and cosairs. In addition, periodic
raids upon Cuban territory were staged by French, English, and Dutch
buccaneers. However, with the exception of a brief period of English
occupation in 1762-63, Spanish rule in Cuba was uninterrupted. From
the very beginning, the Spanish conquistadores cruelly exploited the
inhabitants of the island, exterminating many of the native Indians
and importing large numbers of slaves. Native resistance was led by
an Indian named Hatiley, who when led to the stake by the Spanish,
was offered Christian baptism and absolution. He asked, "[a] re there
white men in heaven?" When told that there were, Hatiiey is reported
to have said-"then I do not want to become a Christian, for I would
not go to a place where I must find men so cruel."2 7 Oppression con-
tinued to characterize Spanish rule in Cuba until its end in 1898.2"
The earliest American interest in Cuba was part of the expansion-
ist spirit that arose in the United States early in the nineteenth century.
The primary energy of this drive was devoted to the establishment of
a continental republic stretching from ocean to ocean. It was this
movement-later colorfully identified as the Manifest Destiny of the
26 My historical survey relied heavily upon Graham H. Stuart's conservative inter-
pretation of the early relations between Cuba and the United States in Stuart, Latin
America and the United States, 195-223 (4th Ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as STUART];
Stuart, Cuba and its International Relations (1923).
27 As told by Beals, The Crime of Cuba, 26 (1933) [hereinafter cited as BEALS].
28 This is developed vividly by BEALS and in Jenks, Our Cuban Colony (1928)
[hereinafter cited as JENKS].
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United States -- that led to the Louisiana Purchase and the annexa-
tions of Florida, California, and Texas, but failed in its effort to in-
corporate Canada. Cuba, considered vital to the protection of Florida
and the Gulf coast was a natural object of American ambition. John
Quincy Adams, writing as Secretary of State in 1823, formulated the
official American expectation as follows:
These islands [Cuba and Puerto Rico] from their local position
are natural appendages to the North American continent, and one
of them [Cuba] almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of
considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to
the commercial and political interests of our Union. . . . [I] n
looking forward to the probable course of events for the short
period of half a century it is scarcely possible to resist the con-
viction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will
be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union
itself.30
This expectation of eventual annexation was accompanied by an
overriding diplomatic policy designed to avoid the transfer by Spain
of its Cuban colony to England or France. The United States did not
regard Spain as much of a threat. Spain had suffered a serious decline
in power and its colonial administration of Cuba was so inefficient
that it did not take advantage of the island's strategic position as a
natural center of- trade and commerce: but English or French occu-
pancy would have been far more threatening to American development.
As early as 1810 President Madison wrote in an official letter that the
United States could not be "a satisfied spectator" if Cuba were to fall
"under any European government, which might make a fulcrum of
that position against the commerce and security of the United States."'"
The United States, in a manner curiously analogous to its present
hemispheric policy, was more disturbed about new extra-hemispheric
intrusions by European nations than by an undesirable status quo
(Spanish rule in Cuba). In 1823 this priority was even made an ex-
plicit part of the Monroe Doctrine:
With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.
32
The basic United States position in this early period combined a re-
spectful deference to Spanish claims in Cuba with the conviction that
the weak Spanish administration would be overthrown from within,
and that an independent Cuba would automatically gravitate towards
the United States sphere of influence, perhaps even seeking annexa-
29 See excellent study by Bemis, Latin American Policy of the U.S. 47, 73-97 (1943).
30 Moore, Digest of International Law, VI, 380 (1906).
31 Quoted by Stuart, Cuba and Its International Relations, at 17.
32 President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823.
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tion. Thus the United States interest in Cuba was adequately protected
so long as no third power capable of taking full advantage of Cuba,
especially England, succeeded Spain as administrator of Cuba.
However, the inhumanities of Spanish colonial administration,
the growing commercial importance of Cuba, and the strong pressure
in the South to expand the slave-owning territory of the United States
generated increasing pressures to make Cuba part of our country after
the annexation of Texas in 1845. Efforts to negotiate the purchase of
Cuba from Spain failed, and this induced American expansionists to
propose more coercive measures to reach their end. Here again the
historical antecedent recalls the contemporary situation. Cuban pa-
triots seeking independence came to the United States to organize an
expedition against Cuba. Their leader was a dedicated revolutionary
named Narciso L6pez. His cause evoked sympathy, especially in the
South, and it was not surprising that his attempt "to recruit an expe-
dition on American soil to free Cuba ... found much assistance in
high quarters. ' 33 However, after easily collecting "the nucleus of a
force," a proclamation in 1849 by President Taylor, "warning all citi-
zens against participation in such enterprises, had a deterrent effect.
The two vessels in which the expedition planned to leave New York
were seized by the authorities, though the filibusters themselves were
not held."134 L6pez, however, was not dissuaded. In 1850 he organized
a second expedition which made a landing in Cuba. This attempt also
failed when L6pez did not "receive the assistance expected from the
natives" and was then "faced with an openly mutinous crew.' 35 A
third L6pez expedition was defeated in 1851. The L6pez expeditions
are a curious anticipation of the rebel invasions of 1961, and displayed
analogous participation by the United States. Interestingly, the diplo-
matic competitors of the United States formally disapproved of the
American failure to prevent its territory from being used by dissident
Cuban exiles to overthrow Spanish rule. A treaty guaranteeing Cuba
to Spain was rumored to have been signed in 1851 by Great Britain,
France, and Spain, and in 1852 the United States was invited to join
England and France in an agreement "disclaiming all intention of
obtaining possession of Cuba."3 The United States declined the invi-
tation although it did assure the European nations that it not only
had "no design upon Cuba itself, but it was willing to assist Spain in
preserving it."37
33 STUART, 208.
34 Id. at 209.
35 Ibid.
36 Id. at 206.
37 Ibid.
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United States policy wavered. In 1853, however, President Pierce
appointed Pierre Soul6 to Spain. Soul6 was an avowed supporter of
L6pez and revived the idea that the future of Cuba must be assimilated
into the Manifest Destiny of the United States, even if this required
the use of force. Soul6 was instructed to negotiate the purchase of
Cuba. The militancy of Soul6's policy was revealed in the "Ostend
Manifesto" which entreated Spain to benefit Cuba and herself by sell-
ing Cuba to the United States. It added, "[b]ut if Spain, dead to the
voice of her own interests, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false
sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States ...
then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting
it from Spain, if we possess the power. 38 President Pierce, unwilling
to apply such explicit pressure, disavowed the Ostend Manifesto, and
Spain ignored it. The slavery issue gradually came to dominate Amer-
ican politics, and the position of the North precluded the incorpora-
tion of any additional slave territory into the Union. Cuba did not
again figure prominently in American concerns until after the Civil
War.
In the closing decades of the century Cuba was in a state of
almost continual internal unrest, highlighted by an internal uprising
in 1868 that lingered on until its final suppression in 1878. Spanish
oppressive rule was slightly liberalized by concessions achieved as a
result of these internal rebellions, but the situation remained intoler-
able. The governmental revenues, gained by burdensome taxes placed
on basic items like flour and salt, were used to fill the Madrid treasury
and to pay exorbitant salaries to the corrupt and inefficient Spanish
colonial elite composed mainly of uneducated, petty bureaucrats. This
situation infuriated the cultured upper classes in Cuba, and kept alive
the passion for national independence. Reforms were illusory, disease
and chaos were rampant, and a new major revolution broke out in 1895
which seems to have received important financial support in the United
States.39 The United States took an official position of aloofness, but
public opinion ardently supported the Cuban independence movement.
American economic interests in Cuba had grown to a point where civil
strife was very costly. In addition, the United States appeared eager
now to have a war so as to display its military prowess as a great
power in the world.40 Tension in Spanish-American relations mounted
to a climax when the United States warship Maine was exploded in the
Havana harbor on January 25, 1898. Congress soon passed a joint
resolution proclaiming Cuban independence, authorizing President Mc-
38 Id. at 208-209.
39 Id. at 216.
40 See JENKS, 48-57.
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Kinley to use the American army and navy to compel the withdrawal
of Spanish forces from Cuba, and disclaiming any intention to impose
American sovereignty upon Cuba beyond that needed to establish
peace and order. Historians feel that the sinking of the Maine was a
pretext for war rather than a cause of war. As Jenks points out, 1896
was the rational moment to intervene on behalf of the oppressed Cu-
bans or to defend American property from plunder. By 1898 Spain
was on its way to reforming the grossest evils of its colonial adminis-
tration as a result of internal and external pressure. War fever in the
United States, then, is viewed as the major explanation for the decision
to wage war against Spain in 1898. It was never clear, for instance,
that Spain was even responsible for blowing up the Maine. War fol-
lowed, ending quickly in a complete victory for the United States. In
the peace treaty signed on December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished all
sovereignty over Cuba and agreed to evacuate at once.
This first phase of Cuban history bears significantly upon the
current state of Cuban-American relations. First, the nineteenth cen-
tury revealed an American concern that alternated between a minimum
policy of keeping political rivals from taking over Cuba and a maxi-
mum policy of annexation. This pattern of alternation between a policy
of protection and one of domination has pervaded United States action
in Latin American from the beginning. Second, American concern
with Cuban welfare was never sufficient to lead us to intervene to estab-
lish an independent Cuba or to resist the frightful barbarism of Spanish
policy. Such aloofness from domestic welfare foreshadows our policy
of tolerance, if not support, until very recent years, of oppressive dic-
tatorships throughout Latin America. Selfish domestic policies-from
slavery to sugar-and not altruism or hemispheric solidarity accounted
for our conduct towards Cuba. It was only when the failures of Span-
ish rule led to internal disorders that hurt American private invest-
ments in Cuba that we were led to act against Spain, and the final
coercive action was not even prompted by such rational considera-
tions as national self-interest. The Spanish-American War resulted
more from war fever than anything else.
The dominant United States concern in the nineteenth century
was to keep extra-continental political rivals out of Cuba and to pro-
tect the interests of American investors within Cuba. Many would
say that the twentieth century is heir to the nineteenth. 4' One can
interestingly substitute England or France for the Soviet Union, Span-
ish colonialism for Castroism, and L6pez for Cardona to perceive the
sturdy strands of continuity.
41 This is emphasized by BEALS, JENKS, Huberman and Sweezy, and Mills. For
latter two books see citation supra note 2.
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Contemporary Cuba inherits from colonial Cuba a tradition of
authoritarian leadership and internal discontent. Fidel Castro knows
how to exercise the leadership by exploiting the discontent. The
dramatization of the United States as the demonic enemy of Cuba,
however, depends upon developments that took place during the sec-
ond phase of Cuban history. Even here, however, hatred of the Span-
iards was a psychological preparation for hatred of the United States;
in each instance it was plausible for national leaders to explain the ills
of Cuba by reference to the domineering role of a foreign nation.
B. 1898-1959
The United States occupied Cuba as an administering power after
the defeat of Spain in 1898. Despite some internal discontent, Ameri-
can administration was welcomed by the Cubans. It performed benef-
icently, improving health and sanitation throughout the island, and
encouraging the formation of institutions of local government. The
colonial legacy of disease, anarchy, and starvation was overcome by
the able American Governor-General Leonard Wood.42 Having re-
stored order the United States acted to end its military trusteeship of
Cuba, thereby honoring its pledge to respect Cuban independence and
to refrain from annexation. A Cuban constitutional convention was
convened to prepare the island for self-government. However, as is
well-known, the United States did compel Cuba to accept, over hostile
objection, the humiliating subordination decreed by the Platt Amend-
ment.43 The most controversial provisions restricted Cuba's power to
contract foreign debts (Article II), gave to the United States a uni-
lateral right to intervene in the internal affairs of Cuba under broad
circumstances (Article III)," bound Cuba not to diminish her sover-
eignty by treaty with a foreign power nor to permit another nation to
exercise military power on the island (Article I), and gave to the
United States coaling and naval bases (Guantanamo) (Article VI).
Cuba was particularly upset about the interventionary right claimed
by the United States. Elihu Root in a dispatch to General Wood tried
to relieve the Cuban fears that Article III would deprive them of their
42 See able exposition in JENKS, 58-84.
43 Cf. JENKS, 78-84, GRABER, 141-142.
44 Article III is so important that its text will be given in full:
The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the
right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance
of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual
liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed
by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and under-
taken by the Government of Cuba.
The entire international agreement known as the Platt Amendment may be found in
Treaties and Conventions, 1776-1909, I, 363-364.
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independence by saying that "[i] t does not give the United States any
right she does not already possess and she has not exercised." The
treaty provision is, however, "of immense value in qualifying the
United States to protect the independence of Cuba."45 That is, Ameri-
can intervention is legitimated in advance, thereby overcoming the
objection of third states to intervention. This was thought especially
useful to meet growing criticism in Latin America of protective inter-
ventions by the United States in the internal affairs of its hemispheric
neighbors during the later applications of the Monroe Doctrine.46 The
Platt Amendment adds legitimacy to the operative diplomatic policy
that arose when the Roosevelt Corollary was added to the Monroe
Doctrine.
The United States did intervene with armed force in 1906 to
restore internal order after a protracted period of civil strife. American
administration lasted until 1909, and on this second occasion was
evidently oppressive, corrupt, and partial to American interests.47 A
brief intervention to protect the sugar crop from destruction during a
rebellion in 1917 also took place. And in 1924 and 1934 the United
States controlled the outcome of civil strife by supplying arms to the
government and placing an embargo on the sale of arms to the in-
surgents. Beyond the actual resort to intervention, the threat of inter-
vention exercised a potent influence on Cuban internal affairs; it has
been observed that "[t]he specter of armed action, which hovered over
Cuban-American relations, undoubtedly deserves a large share of the
credit for making Cubans tractable. ' 4 Resentment against the hege-
monial role of the United States increased. American economic domi-
nation of Cuba-its sugar industry and its international trade-and
the interventionary prerogative claimed under the Platt Amendment
were the principal bases of the unpopularity of the United States.49
However, as Graber has pointed out, the Platt Amendment did not
actually expand the interventionary practices of the United States.5"
It merely gave a semblance of bilateralism and legality to the inter-
ventionary patterns of practice that developed in relation to the later
applications of the Monroe Doctrine to protect business interests of
American citizens in Latin America, and especially Central America.
4G Quoted in JENKS, 81.
46 Cf. GRABER, 141: "Judging from the use made of such treaties, they were
not intended to convey rights of interference beyond those inherent in the right of
intervention."
47 See JENKS 87-103.
48 GRABER at 145.
40 This is the main emphasis in the full-length studies made by Jenks and Huber-
man and Sweezy.
GO Fitzgibbon, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 114.
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Proximity to the United States accounts for the particularly heavy
influence, more than did the Platt Amendment. The lament attributed
to the Mexican President Porforio Diaz, "Poor Mexico-so far from
God, so near to the United States," seems equally pertinent to Cuba's
situation.
A permanent handicap to the image of the United States in Cuba
has resulted from our apparent support of ruthless dictators of the
right. American economic interests wanted internal political order and
the social status quo. For these purposes a dictator was ideal. He
could also be persuaded by graft to accord favorable treatment to
business interests. Such dictatorships often lack internal popular
support, and actually invite external intervention to suppress a popu-
lar protest movement. Thus an invitation to intervene by a reactionary
dictator, although significant for purposes of legal evaluation, makes
an intervention less, rather than more, acceptable. It is in this light
that one must understand the hatred of the United States aroused by
our support of the reviled Cuban dictator, Machado, from 1925-1931;
this man was a bloody tyrant "crushing all his opposition to the extent
of imprisoning and assassinating his adversaries."'" In 1928 the United
States sent Harry F. Guggenheim, a prominent Latin American busi-
nessman, as our Ambassador to Cuba; ". . . he stood consistently
behind President Machado and the maintenance of a strong, stable
government."52 It was quite literally like supporting Al Capone as the
Head of State of a foreign nation, and tolerating his gangster meth-
ods.5" Machado was eventually overthrown because a drop in the
world sugar price threatened the Cuban government with bankruptcy. 4
The interweaving of the fortunes of the sugar industry and political
change tell an interesting part of the Cuban story.55
In 1934, fearing a failure to maintain stability, the United States
withheld recognition from Grau San Martin who was the first reformist
figure to emerge as a Cuban leader. Our opposition to this liberal
president led to the downfall of his government, and its replacement
in 1934 by a dictatorship in which Batista was the decisive force. The
United States thus gave its powerful backing to repressive dictator-
ships, opposed reformist elements, and proclaimed at Pan American
Congresses its commitment to the principles of liberal democracy. The
gap between the word and the deed exacerbated the wound caused by
51 STUART at 238.
52 Ibid.
53 STUART, 237-241; BEALS, 235-399.
54 STUART, 238-239.
55 See especially books by Jenks and Huberman and Sweezy for comprehensive
account.
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our support of reactionary governments that left the mass of Cubans
in a condition of grave poverty, disease, and illiteracy.
As is well known President Franklin Roosevelt was eager to im-
prove American relations with Latin America. He acknowledged the
widespread opposition aroused by interventionary practices and claims.
Thus the United States was led to renounce its interventionary privi-
lege, whether based on the unilateralism of the Monroe Doctrine or
the spurious bilateralism of the Platt Amendment.5 Thus the United
States followed its general nonintervention pledge of 1933 with a for-
mal renunciation in 1934 of the right of Cuban intervention that had
been conferred by the Platt Amendment. However, the United States
continued to dominate Cuban affairs by exerting economic and psy-
chological pressure. A recent commentator suggests the term "Platt-
ism" to describe this less structured hegemony that characterized the
role of the United States in Cuban affairs until the fall of Batista in
1 9 5 9 .17 This American role was perceived hostily by Cubans con-
cerned with the achievement of internal'social and economic progress.
As such, it must be regarded as a significant part of the background
favorable to the emergence of Fidel Castro.
This survey of Cuban-American relations contains many gross
simplifications. However, it is intended to help one to understand the
general character of Castroism and, especially, the use by Castro of
anti-American sentiment to mobilize public opinion. Castro has brought
to Cuba its first program of radical social change. He responds thus to
the need to overcome the pitiful state of the impoverished masses,
especially those living in rural Cuba.5 His economic measures of land
reform and nationalization must be viewed against this background
of inequality and foreign domination. His political hostility to our
country must be understood in the light of sixty years of humiliating
Cuban subordination to the United States, especially drawing sus-
tenance from our role in keeping men like Machado and Batista in
power.
The early colonial history of Cuba suggests the deep roots of
authoritarian political rule and foreign economic exploitation in Cuban
tradition. It reveals, also, our expansionist interest in Cuba and our
unwillingness to act against Spain to achieve Cuban national inde-
pendence until we were ready for selfish purposes to fight the Spanish-
American War in 1898. The settlement of that war led to a prolonged
American military occupation and a formalized acceptance of United
States hegemony in the Platt Amendment.
56 The full development is outlined further in this manuscript.
57 Fitzgibbon, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 114.
58 Huberman and Sweezy; op. cit. supra, note 2, at 1-10; Nelson, Rural Cuba
(1950).
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From the Civil War onwards the United States exercised an im-
portant role in the economic life of the island. The crippling depend-
ence of Cuba upon her sugar industry 9 gave the United States, as
dominant consumer, an enormous control lever over Cuban affairs. In
addition, quota preferences and subsidies to the sugar trade helped the
Americans who owned the large plantations to earn huge profits, but
did not filter significantly downwards to help raise the standard of
living of the average Cuban. Thus American generosity to Cuba in
trade relations was usually beneficial only to a small economic elite,
composed largely of Americans and a few wealthy Cuban families.
Such a negative characterization of the American role in Cuba is
not the full story, but it does account for the way in which we are
perceived by reformist and radical Cuban social and political groups.
It would be easy to show, for instance, that without the participation of
the United States in pre-Castro times Cuba would have been in an even
worse condition with greater socio-economic disparities a less developed
economy, and a political atmosphere alternating between bloody strife
and bloody tyranny.
III. INTERVENTIONS AND PROVOCATIONS 1959-1961
A factual account of the deterioration of United States relations
with Cuba between the period of January 1, 1959 and April 17, 1961
is enormously complex6 ° and inessential to the purposes of this article.
Some of the implications of this deterioration will be suggested in a
concluding assessment. Three interventionary measures by the United
States seems central to the task of legal evaluation:
(1) The elimination by the United States on July 6, 1960, of the
import quota assigned to Cuban sugar at guaranteed prices; the de-
pendence of internal Cuba upon revenue and foreign exchange from
sales of sugar to the United States gave to this conduct a highly coer-
cive tendency designed to impose the will of the United States upon
Cuban internal affairs. Such an effort to bring Cuba to its knees will
be characterized for purposes of later discussion as "indirect economic
intervention."
59 Persuasively described with supporting statistics id. at 11-22; see full account
in JENKS.
60 It can be traced by use of the N.Y. Times for the period; for a convenient
summary of the highlights up to November 1960 see Cuba and the United States (ed.
by A. G. Mezerik) (1960); a full account of the U.S. position is given by the Depart-
ment of State in its "white paper" released on April 3, 1961: Cuba, Dep't. of State
publication 7171 (1961). An excellent analysis of the significance of this period can be
found in Blanksten, "Fidel Castro and Latin America" (paper prepared for delivery
at 1961 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association); see also
Draper, "Castro's Cuba," 90 Encounter 6 (1961).
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(2) On October 19, 1960, the United States placed an embargo
on all exports to Cuba "except for non-subsidized foodstuffs, machines,
and medical supplies;"'" such an embargo was an explicit retaliation
for Cuban confiscation of American property in Cuba and alleged fiscal
discrimination against American products and business; however, such
pressure brought to bear by a relatively more powerful state upon a
weak state seems also to constitute "indirect, economic intervention."
(3) The United States used its facilities and its territory to train,
advise, finance, equip, and transport the Cuban rebels who took part
in the anti-Castro invasion of April 1961; as was observed a week after
the invasion: "The government [of the United States] no longer denies
that the CIA, acting upon Presidential authority, did organize and
direct last week's attempted invasion of Cuba."62 Such sponsorship
of an armed attack upon a nation with which we are at peace can be
regarded either as an "act of aggression" or as "indirect armed inter-
vention."
These three interventionary efforts by the United States suffi-
ciently depict the background facts to enable a discussion of the legal
doctrine of nonintervention.
The legal status of these interventions must not be viewed in
isolation. It is crucial to have an awareness of the character of provo-
cations that led the United States to pursue an interventionary course
in conflict with its legal commitment to nonintervention. In fact, the
apparent absence of United States alternatives to intervention is part
of the reason why it is so important to attain a calm understanding
of these events. To do this, however, one must realize that a provoca-
tion short of an armed attack, entitling a state to have recourse to self-
defense, is irrelevant to an appraisal of the illegality of interventionary
conduct. 63 Having said this, let me enumerate now the provocations
or alleged provocations" that led us to seek an illegal interventionary
solution to our difficulties with Cuba: 65
61 For text of U.S. announcement of the embargo see N.Y. Times, October 20,
1961, p. 8.
62 Rovere, Letter From Washington, New Yorker, May 6, 1961, p. 139.
63 The phrasing of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter appears unambiguous
on this point. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations. . . ." (emphasis added); but see, Stone, Aggression and World Order
(1958).
64 The concept of "alleged provocation" intends to highlight the absence of con-
vincing evidence that the Soviet Union has intervened in Cuban internal affairs or that
Cuba has aligned itself with the Soviet bloc or even that the Cuban government is
presently Communist-controlled.
65 See State Department white paper Cuba, op. cit. supra, note 60; Berle, op. cit.
supra, note 2.
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(1) Extra-hemispheric interference in Cuban affairs by members
of the Sino-Soviet bloc;
(2) Characterization of the Castro government as subject to the
control of the international communist movement;
(3) Anti-American animus of Castro's leadership, arousing hos-
tility and hatred;
(4) Castro's internal totalitarianism which was said to betray the
liberal democratic ideals of the revolution as he had proclaimed
them in the 1957 Declaration from Sierra Maestra;
(5) Confiscation of property owned by American nationals and
discriminatory enforcement of taxing laws and foreign exchange
regulations;
(6) Refusal by Castro to seek peaceful settlement of differences
with the United States through mediation of the OAS;" 6
(7) Generation of subversion and intervention throughout Latin
America by efforts of Castro to export his brand of revolution;
(8) Refusal of the OAS to take collective action of an effective
variety against Castro;
(9) Fear that the success of Castro in Cuba would lead to new
Castros throughout Latin America, thereby imperiling hemispheric
solidarity as well as the private investments of United States
citizens.
Thus we are ready to proceed with a discussion of the relevant
legal norms. One question should be kept in mind. It is posed by the
pressure exerted by the intense provocations upon the absolute com-
mitment to refrain from intervention. It is underscored when the
target of intervention is a recalcitrant debtor state that has violated
legal obligations designed to protect the position of the intervening
creditor state. What alternatives to intervention were available to the
United States to protect the legal rights of its nationals in Cuba, given
the unwillingness of Castro to submit disputes to settlement and given
the unwillingness of the OAS to act? This is an issue quite separate
from the overriding tendency of the United States to ignore certain
legal restraints under the pressure of waging the Cold War.
IV. LEGAL DOCTRINES PERTAINING TO NONINTERVENTION
An exposition of relevant legal doctrine reveals why the anti-
Castro conduct of the United States is regarded here as illegal. An
acknowledgement of illegality seems to be a necessary starting-point
for a useful evaluation of the United States' response to the Castro
challenge. Artificial attempts to classify American conduct as legal
obscure the real issue: can we adhere to the legal principle of non-
intervention in the light of the general political character of the Cold
War? 67 That is, given the Cold War and the tendency of the Commu-
66 For text of U.S. Note to OAS on Cuba see N.Y. Times, October 29, 1960, p. 2.
67 This general question was asked and answered negatively in a provocative
book-Loewenstein, Political Reconstruction (1946).
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nist movement to extend to the hemisphere its anti-democratic social
order is it tolerable for the liberal democratic states to be bound by
legal rules prohibiting intervention? To date our leaders have not been
willing to put the question in this way. Instead we have been given a
very strained account of the facts of American participation"8 and a
remarkably narrow interpretation of the relevance of the noninterven-
tion commitment. 69
In view of this it would seem helpful to indicate the reasons why
our legal commitments have been violated by our participation in the
battle against the Castro regime. We are provided, in addition, an apt
occasion, first, for revaluing the adequacy of these particular legal
standards in the kind of world that exists at present. Second, the
failure of the interventionary course in Cuba allows us to rediscern
the political strength of the nonintervention principle; that is, our
concern with the politics of the Cold War may have led us to fail to
perceive the law-reenforcing higher relevance of the politics of na-
tionalism. Hence, the Cold War rivals, intent on keeping their con-
flict safely short of nuclear war, may come to discover that it is mutu-
ally advantageous to adhere, on a reciprocal basis, to a strict interpreta-
tion of the rules of nonintervention. But to perceive this possibility it
is necessary to understand clearly the breadth of the nonintervention
requirement, especially as it has developed in the Western Hemisphere.
To reach this result we must carefully avoid construing noninterven-
tion in a political manner (that is, to legitimate national conduct).
This approach suggests that national policy may not always be con-
sistent with national interest. Such a discovery might itself help to
avoid the kind of tactical miscalculation that prompted us to help the
rebels invade Cuba. It might even restrengthen the belief that the
rule of law retains political vitality despite the tensions of the Cold
War.70
A. General Considerations
This is a vague, confusing, and complex matter. For while there
is general agreement that the duty to refrain from intervention is an
implied correlate of the right of national independence and sovereignty,
there is considerable controversy as to the nature of this duty. It is
60 E.g., the defensive position taken by U.S. officials in the United Nations and
elsewhere with the unchallenged accounts in the U.S. press.
69 President Kennedy suggested in his address "The Lesson of Cuba" that we
would not attack Cuba with military force because it would have been "contrary to
our traditions and to our international obligations," thereby implying that what we
had done was, in contrast, consistent with our traditions and legal obligations. But,
as will be shown, this can not fairly be said to be the case.
70 See Letter of Professor John P. Roche, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1961, p. 36;
letter signed by 43 Princeton professors, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1961, p. 34.
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clear that no nation may use or threaten to use armed force to impose
its will upon another nation except when acting in self-defense against
an armed attack.71 But it is less evident to identify conduct as a
prohibited use of force. Coercive interference by means other than
armed attack-hostile propaganda, economic boycott, subversion, aid
to counterrevolutionaries-appear to be equally embraced within the
implied right of a nation to haye its independence respected by other
nations. The concept of nonintervention also seeks to implement the
doctrine in international law that acknowledges the equality of states.
Nonintervention is the way in which strong states fulfill the obligation
to accept the equality of weak states. Therefore, in general, it is inter-
preted to impose a duty upon strong states to refrain from manipu-
lating, by the use of coercion, the affairs of weak states. The legality
of specific conduct would depend less upon the means used than the
ends sought, provided only that the allegedly intervening state pos-
sessed superior strength; that is, it would not be intelligible to talk
of Cuba intervening in the internal affairs of the United States; yet,
Cuba might be guilty of intervention in the affairs of the Dominican
Republic.7 2
The seriousness of intervention depends partly on the extent of
its objective in relation to the independence of the target state. For
instance, the early coercive objectives of the United States (e.g., the
cut in the sugar quota and the economic embargo) sought only to
influence internal Cuban policy (e.g., to discourage expropriations of
property and involvement in the Soviet Bloc); whereas, the support
for the rebel exiles evidently sought to replace the Castro government
with one more in accord with American interests.
We must also look at the intensity of coercion to determine the
seriousness of an intervention. It is one thing to express sympathy
for a revolutionary movement, as we did for Castro when he was on
the verge of victory in 1958 and quite another to supply revolution-
aries with arms, training, and transportation as we have done for
Artime, Ray, and Cardona in 1961.
Finally, the seriousness of intervention also depends upon the
character of the provoking motive. The spectrum contains self-defense
at one end and the gratuitous extension of national power at the other.
Interventions to restore internal order, to prevent the persecution of
minority groups, to overthrow an oppressive or colonial government,
to enforce by self-help the legal duties of the target state with respect
to private investment or public debt, to reinstate a governing elite
friendly to a Cold War bloc leader, to discourage the use of territory
71 Supra, note 63.
72 It is, in general, the relative power advantage that makes intervention possible.
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as a base for terrorist activities73 are typical illustrations of conduct
that is more difficult to classify. Some of the difficulty arises because
there is no adequate vertical institution with compulsory jurisdiction
to determine whether contested acts constitute "interventions." 74 Fur-
thermore, the instability introduced by the Cold War induces double
interventions by the bloc leaders, each intervening on behalf of its
preferred elite; this makes a failure to intervene an acquiescence to
intervention; whereas, an equivalent intervention leads to a neutraliza-
tion of the first intervention. Thus, the second intervention may be
noninterventionary in effect-leaving the target state about where it
would have been without either intervention.75
Additional difficulty arises because the legal principles forbidding
intervention are so frequently confused with moral and political con-
siderations which favor a policy of selective intervention.76 The prob-
lem of classification is further enhanced by the reliance of customary
international law upon patterns of practice to change legal rules77 and
by the tendency for complementary opposed legal norms to be avail-
able to national actors for contrary descriptions of their conduct.78
Despite these difficulties of classification, two rather clear con-
clusions are possible: first, nations may not use armed force to carry
out an interventionary policy unless they have been the victims of an
armed attack and are acting in self-defense; second, recourses to in-
terventionary coercion, other than by armed force, are incompatible
with the fundamental doctrines of international law relating to sover-
eignty, territorial jurisdiction, equality of states, and national inde-
pendence.
The United Nations Charter as the organic law of the world com-
munity, bears significantly upon the status of interventionary conduct.
Article 2 (4) incorporates the legal commitment to renounce the use of
force in international relations; Article 2 (7) withholds from the Organ-
ization the right to intervene in domestic affairs unless essential to the
paramount duty to maintain world peace; 7" Article 1(4) endorses the
73 This was part of Israel's claim of justification in the 1956 Sinai campaign.
74 The use of the United Nations to determine issues of this sort manifests the
slow growth of vertical control over the use of force, especially outside the Cold. War.
75 Falk, op. cit. supra note 10, at 169.
76 Letter of Professor Wolfgang Friedman, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1961, p. 28.
77 Macgibbon, "Customary International Law and Acquiescence," 33 Brit. Yb.
Int'l L. 115, 195 (1959).
78 McDougal and Feliciano, "Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion:
Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective," 68 Yale L. J. 1057, 1059-1063 (1959).
79 That is, the United Nations is made subject to a limited doctrine of noninter-
vention by the terms of the Charter. This is a complicated question that can only be
raised here in general terms.
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principle of equal rights and self-determination; Article 33 pledges
states to seek a pacific solution to any dispute that is likely to endanger
peace; Article 52(3) instructs the Security Council to seek pacific
settlement of disputes through the utilization of available regional
organizations; and, in addition, of course, the entire machinery of the
United Nations is designed to promote the maintenance of peace. Much
of the Charter as well as the Uniting For Peace Resolution are rele-
vant in this respect. The United Nations Charter is very unspecific
in its reference to prohibitions against coercion other than armed force.
The entire apparatus of the Charter is aimed to re-enforce the tradi-
tional view of the sovereign equality of states, which rests upon the
entailed principle that no state is permitted to interfere in the internal
affairs of other states. The legality of American use of coercion against
Cuba must be viewed in relation to this Charter background.
B. Specific Legal Commitments
United States participation in the armed invasion of Cuba on
April 17, 1961 clearly violated legal obligations contained in binding
international agreements defining the international relations of states
in the Western Hemisphere (other than Canada). In addition, Ameri-
can efforts to apply pressure by recourse to earlier coercive economic
measures, especially the embargo on trade and the cut in the sugar
quota, constituted illegal indirect intervention. The development of
law pertaining to nonintervention in this hemisphere is an expression
of protest against the extensive practice by the United States of inter-
vention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. The Mon-
roe Doctrine was proclaimed in 1823 to discourage the efforts of the
Holy Alliance to recover for Spain sovereign control over her Latin
American colonies that had declared their independence early in the
nineteenth century.s0 It was largely designed to discourage European
intervention in Latin American internal affairs. When this danger
receded, the Monroe Doctrine was retained and expanded to serve as
a multi-pronged rationalization for American intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of Latin American countries on whatever occasion it
seemed to serve the national interests of the United States to do so.
President Theodore Roosevelt's explanation of the United States inter-
vention in Panama in 1903 to protect the construction of the Canal
expressed well the spirit of American interventionary practice:
We, in effect, policed the Isthmus in the interests of its inhabitants
and of our own national needs, and for the good of the entire
civilized world. Under such circumstances the Government of the
United States would have been guilty of folly and weakness,
80 THOMAS, 10-20.
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amounting in their sum to a crime against the nation, had it acted
otherwise than it did .... 81
Our later Monroe Doctrine practice was a curious blend of im-
perialism and paternalism. We intervened to protect American invest-
ments and, at the same time, we kept the Latin American penchant
for revolutionary politics from leading nations into a condition of
chaos, and eventual bankruptcy. Our object was to maintain the social
status quo in an atmosphere of maximum political stability-this being
the most favorable situation for the promotion of our economic in-
terests. We did not use our interventionary domination, however, as
a pretext for permanent occupation. Nevertheless, all vocal groups in
Latin America resented the interventionary claims and practices of
the United States. The Latin American view prevailed that the Monroe
Doctrine should be regarded as a unilateral declaration of policy by
the United States rather than as a regional understanding governing
international relations in the hemisphere. 2 Pressure mounted after
World War I, and the United States was gradually persuaded to join
in legal pledges to refrain from intervention, thereby abandoning its
role under the Monroe Doctrine.8 3
The last explicit defense of the American right to intervene was
made by Charles Evans Hughes, as Secretary of State, at the Sixth
Pan American Conference held at Havana in 1928. He put the United
States position candidly:
Let us face facts. The difficulty, if there is any, in any one of the
American Republics, is not of any external aggression. It is an in-
ternal difficulty, if it exists at all .... What are we going to do
when the government breaks down and American citizens are in
danger of their lives? . . . Now it is a principle of international
law-I would call it interposition of a temporary character-for
the purpose of protecting of lives and property of its nationals.8 4
Despite the ability of the United States in 1928 to block the
incorporation of nonintervention into a treaty at Havana, several im-
portant legal steps were taken to curtail, indirectly, the scope of the
interventionary claim. For purposes of evaluating the Cuban situation,
81 Quoted by GRABER, 138.
82 A quasi-legitimation of the Monroe Doctrine was given by Article 21 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to
affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional
understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of the peace."
Sohn, Basic Documents of the United Nations, 277, 283 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
SOHN].
83 The process is described by Bemis, op. cit. supra, note 29, at 226-294.
84 Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth Inter-
national Conference of American States held at Havana, Cuba, January 16 to February
20, 1928, 14 (1928).
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the most significant of these steps was the Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife, Article 1 of which
seems directly to establish the illegality of American support for the
Castro exiles:
The contracting states bind themselves to observe the following
rules with regard to civil strife in another one of them:
1. To use all means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants
of their territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in, gathering
elements, crossing the boundary or sailing from their territory for
purpose of starting or promoting civil strife.
2. To disarm and intern every rebel force crossing their bound-
aries, the expense of internment to be borne by the state where
public order may have been disrupted. The arms found in the
hands of the country granting asylum, to be returned, once the
struggle has ended, to the state in civil strife.
3. To forbid the traffic in arms and war material, except when
intended for the government, while the belligerency of the rebels
has not been recognized, in which latter case the rules of neutrality
shall be applied.
4. To prevent that within their jurisdiction there be equipped,
armed or adapted for warlike purposes any vessel intended to
operate in favor of the rebellion.8 5
At the same time a Convention on Asylum was adopted to authorize
signatories to grant asylum to political fugitives from other countries
in the interests of "humanitarian toleration." '86 Both legal commit-
ments have obvious relevance to the duties of the United States with
respect to the Castro exiles. It is acceptable to give sanctuary, but
it is certainly illegal to help exiles form a revolutionary movement on
our territory, and illegal to tolerate even passively the use of our
territory to foment civil strife in another country.87
There is a horizontal implementation of such a legal standard
expressed generally in domestic legal provisions applicable to neutral-
ity,8 and, more particularly, in a federal provision of the United States
Code making it a crime to use our territory as a base for hostile mili-
tary operations against a state with which we are at peace:
§ 960 Expedition against friendly nation.
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on
foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money
85 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife, 22
Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 159 (1928).
86 Convention on Asylum, 22 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 158 (1928); but see Ambas-
sador Stevenson's defense of U.S. grants of asylum in the U.N.: Stevenson, "Statement
of April 20," 44 Dep't State Bull. 681, 684 (1961).
87 This much of the doctrine of nonintervention seems to be solidly accepted on
the Western Hemisphere.
88 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 441-457 (1939).
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for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enter-
prise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion
of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district or people
with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more
than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.8 9
This seems to apply clearly to Cubans or Americans that participated
in the direction and execution of the April 1961 invasion, so far as
their action took place "within the United States."9 The United States
was, of course, "at peace" with Cuba, despite the fact that diplomatic
relations were broken in January 1961. In any event activity in the
United States forbidden by § 960 long antedated the termination of
diplomatic relations.
This aspect of the Cuban invasion has also received an important
vertical expression in the form of the Draft Code of Offenses Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind which was adopted by the Inter-
national Law Commission of the United Nations in 1954. The Draft
Code imposes criminal responsibility upon individuals who commit
specified acts. Included among the provisions of Article 2 one finds:
(4) The organization, or the encouragement of the organization,
by the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its territory
or any other territory for incursions into the territory of another
State, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own
territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands of its
territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for
incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct par-
ticipation in or support of such incursions.
(5) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a
State of activities calculated to foment civil strife in another State,
or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activi-
ties calculated to foment civil strife in another State.
(6) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a
State of terrorist activities in another State, or the toleration by
the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to
carry out terrorist acts in another State.
(9) The intervention by the authorities of a State in the inter-
nal or external affairs of another State, by means of coercive meas-
ures of an economic or political character in order to force its
will and thereby obtain advantages of any kind.91
Article 3 extends the responsibility of the Code to a Head of
State or to the responsible governmental official, and Article 4 ex-
89 18 U.S.C.A. § 960 (1948).
90 Ambassador Stevenson in the course of a United Nations debate granted the
force of this legal restraint when he said, "I wish to make clear also that we would
be opposed to the use of our territory for mounting an offensive against any foreign
government." "Statement of April 17," 44 Dep't State Bull. 668 (1961).
91 SOHIN, 99-100.
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cludes the defense of superior orders provided the individual charged
retained the possibility to refuse the orders. Such a Draft Code is not
a binding international agreement, but its endorsement by the Inter-
national Law Commission may be taken as expressive of standards
accepted by the international community. Given the distinctive proc-
esses for law-making on a global basis such an endorsement may be
considered as a stage in the enunciation of a new legal doctrine. In
fact, the rationale of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Judgments in the war
crimes trials after World War II is illustrative of the way in which a
global commitment to a standard of civilized behavior can be trans-
formed on an ad koc basis into an applicable legal obligation. This was
certainly true with respect to the use of "Crimes against Humanity"
as a basis for individual responsibility under international law at
Nuremberg. The sweeping relevance of such standards-even if con-
sidered as stating only the aspirations of the world society-to the
encouragement of the counterrevolutionary cause of the Castro exiles
is too obvious to require specific comment.
The willingness of the United States to commit itself directly and
explicitly to nonintervention resulted from the view taken of Latin
American relations by Franklin D. Roosevelt. As early as 1928 Roose-
velt wrote an article foreshadowing the later legal-diplomatic shift of
the United States:
It is possible that in the days to come one of our sister nations
may fall upon evil days; disorder and bad government may require
a helping hand be given her citizens as a matter of temporary
necessity to bring back order and stability. In that event it is not
the right or the duty of the United States to intervene alone.
"[R] ather," he adds, significantly, it is "the duty of the United States
to give intelligent joint study to the problem, and, if the conditions
warrant, to offer the helping hand or hands in the name of the Ameri-
cas. Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other
nations must end; with the cooperation of others we shall have more
order in this hemisphere and less dislike."92 This later matured into
the Good Neighbor Policy with its stress upon common interest and
cooperative action. Accordingly, in 1933 at Montevideo a Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States specified in Article 8 that "No state
had the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of an-
other. '93 This Convention was subject to a reservation by the United
States which advised that the principle of nonintervention, in the ab-
92 F. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy," 6 Foreign Aff. 573 (1928).
93 International Conferences of American States, First Supplement, 1933-1940, Con-
vention on Rights and Duties of States, 121, 122 (1940) [hereinafter cited as INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCES].
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sence of a common standard of definition, would be construed in the
light of "the doctrines and policies .. embodied in the different ad-
dresses of President Roosevelt ... and in the law of nations as gener-
ally recognized and accepted."94
It is significant to observe that the United States refused to accept
the broad definition of intervention that had been included in the draft
formulation of Article 8 that was proposed at Montevideo: "Any act
of a State, through diplomatic representation, by armed force, or by
any other means involving effective force, with a view to making the
State's will dominate the will of another State, and, in general, any
maneuver, interference or interposition9" of any sort, employing such
means, either directly or indirectly in matters of obligation of State,
whatever its motive, shall be considered as Intervention, and likewise
a violation of International Law."96 This proposed definition and its
rejection by the United States is very suggestive with respect to what
was the scope of nonintervention sought by the Latin American coun-
tries as contrasted with the legal obligation the United States was
ready to accept. A perceptive student of Latin American diplomacy
has well summarized the significance of this first legal pledge to refrain
from intervention by the United States:
The Montevideo pledge meant that the United States had ab-jured armed intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.
By implication, intervention through means other than armed
force could continue.97
Because of broader legal commitments that came later it is of
no practical importance to determine whether the United States spon-
sorship of the invasion by the Castro exiles constituted a violation of
Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States.98 Certainly, such sponsorship comes within the prohibition of
the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention that was con-
cluded at Buenos Aires in 1936 and later ratified by the United States
with neither a reservation nor a dissenting vote in the Senate. The
Preamble of the Additional Protocol recalled the Montevideo noninter-
vention pledge, and can be appropriately regarded as a full acceptance
94 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, 124.
95 This recalls Secretary Hughes' distinction between intervention and interposition
made at Hanava in 1928, see op. cit. supra, note 84.
96 Seventh International Conference of American States. First, Second and Eighth
Committees, Minutes and Antecedents, 165 (Montevideo 1933).
07 GRABER, 205.
98 President Kennedy's interpretation of the nonintervention doctrine amounts to
reaffirming the Montevideo pledge as the measure of the U.S. obligation. From the
viewpoint of law, however, this neglects the broader commitments subsequent to 1933
subscribed to by the United States. For the Kennedy position see supra pp. 7-8.
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by the United States of the Latin American insistence upon a doctrine
of absolute nonintervention." Articles 1 and 2 contain the substance
of the legal obligation accepted by the United States:
Article 1.-The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible
the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for
whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of
the Parties.
The violation of the provisions of this Article shall give rise to
mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seek-
ing methods of peaceful adjustment.
Article 2.-It is agreed that every question concerning the inter-
pretation of the present Additional Protocol, which it has not been
possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted
to the procedure of conciliation provided for in the agreements in
force, or to arbitration, or to judicial settlement. 00
The United States accepted the obligation to refrain from interventions
other than by armed force and to submit a dispute as to what consti-
tuted intervention to a supranational body of resolution. This would,
as well, imply a commitment to abide by the results of such a third-
party determination.
The failure of the nonintervention system to protect the national
independence of Spain during its civil war' 0 together with the aggres-
sive extension of Nazi influence to some of the South American nations
led to an effort to assure collective resistance to an extra-hemispheric
intrusion. The threat of a concerted European intervention in the
Western Hemisphere was present for the first time since the Triple
Alliance at Troppau in 1820 had proposed to win back Spain's lost
colonies in Latin America; this was the situation, it will be recalled,
that prompted the Monroe Doctrine. There was no prospect of legit-
imating a revival of a unilateral right of protective intervention to be
exercised on behalf of hemispheric welfare by the United States. Latin
American states had no inclination to give up the doctrine of noninter-
vention. Instead an idea of collective intervention to prevent extra-
hemispheric intrusion began to take definite shape in the Declaration
of the Principles of the Solidarity of America approved at Lima in
1938. The Preamble of the Declaration of Lima recalled the Protocol
of Non-intervention, while the operative portions of the declaration
stated the importance of "continental solidarity" so as to defend each
American state "against all foreign intervention or activity that may
9 Fenwick, "Intervention; Individual and Collective," 39 Am. J. Int'l L. 645, 656
(1945).
100 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, 191.
101 Cf., Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife
(1939).
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threaten them" by recourse to effective collective action."°2 The
doctrine of absolute nonintervention supplemented by a declaration of
solidarity to resist extra-hemispheric intrusions of influence by col-
lective action continue as the explicit foundation of the legal relations
between the United States and Latin America.10
3
The Declaration of Lima was supplemented in 1940 by the Act
of Havana which declared that "any attempt on the part of a non-
American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory,
the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State
shall be considered an act of aggression"'0 4 and that cooperative action
should then be taken in the spirit of collective self-defense.' The
concern was to defend against the emergence in South America, by
subversion or otherwise, of a government sympathetic to the Axis
powers. In 1942 as a result of the threats posed by World War II
the inter-American system created the Emergency Advisory Committee
for Political Defense of the Continent which was quite successful in
using collective non-recognition as a means to resist the emergence
of pro-Axis governments.'0 6 Hemispheric consensus gave strong polit-
ical backing to the shift from the unilateral to multilateral resistance
against extra-hemispheric interference.0 7 In 1945 the Act of Chapul-
tepec adopted at an Inter-American Conference on War and Peace
reaffirmed the commitment to hemispheric solidarity and reciprocal
assistance.' Such sentiments were given effective implementation in
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance concluded at Rio
de Janeiro in 1947.10
The most comprehensive effort to establish a legal order for the
Americas is contained in the Charter of Bogoti that was signed in
1948.110 Particularly relevant is its reformulation of the absolute
nonintervention obligation to cover collective intervention in Article
15:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not
102 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, 308-309.
103 This was succinctly put by Secretary Herter at Santiago in 1959. See op. cit.
supra, note 15.
104 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, 360.
105 Id. at 373.
1o THOMAS, 251.
107 Suppose that a society chooses to become "communist" by democratic processes
and without external interference?
10s Full account and analysis found in Caynes, "The Inter-American System and
The Conference of Chapultepec," 39 Am. J. Intl L. 504 (1945).
109 SOHN, 110.
110 Id. at 117.
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only armed attack but also any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personalty of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements.
We must use this broad prohibition of intervention in order to
appraise the legality of the anti-Castro course of United States policy.
Such a legal obligation can not be satisfied merely by refraining from
the use of armed forces in an invasion, as was implied when President
Kennedy said:
While we could not be expected to hide our sympathies, we made
it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would
not intervene in any way.
Any unilateral American intervention, in the absence of an ex-
ternal attack upon ourselves or an ally, would have been contrary
to our traditions and to our international obligations."'
This is true, but it is not responsive to the charge of indirect inter-
vention brought against the United States by Cuba and others. It
suggests a scope of nonintervention that is arguably in accord with
Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention and the Charter of the United
Nations, but it does not acknowledge the scope of the legal duty
imposed upon the United States by Article 15 of the Charter of BogotA.
The conduct of the United States also seems to violate Article 16 of
the same Convention:
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will
of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
Such governing standards seem to compel a conclusion of illegality.
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance provides:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sover-
eignty or political independence of any American State should be
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack . . . the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree
on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist
the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which
should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance
of the peace and security of the Continent.1
2
The Cuban Revolutionary Council has urged Article 6 as a basis for
collective action by the OAS against Castro. This seems somewhat
strained. It presumablr makes reference to the influence exerted by the
Soviet Union, and possibly Communist China, upon Cuban internal
affairs. But the evidence presently available indicates that the Sino-
Soviet interference extends only to offers of military support in the
111 Kennedy, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 659.
112 SOHN, 111.
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event of an armed attack by the United States upon Cuba" 3 and
widespread cooperation with and support for Castro in the area of
trade and commerce. But if this is characterized as "aggression" it
makes a mockery of the concept in a world in which bloc leaders on
both sides of the Cold War consistently act to ingratiate themselves
with unaligned nations. Would any one contend that United States
aid to Tito in Yugoslavia or even to Poland constitutes aggression?
However, the special status of the international Communist move-
ment in inter-American relations may give some legal basis to those
who urge collective action by the OAS. At the Bogota Conference
in 1948 and again at the Foreign Ministers Meeting of American
States held at Washington in 1951 all the American republics went on
record as "condemning the interventionist character of the interna-
tionalist Communist movement and expressing their determination to
take the necessary measures to counteract its subversive activities." 4
In 1954 at the Tenth Inter-American Conference a Declaration of
Solidarity was adopted which condemned "[t]he activities of the inter-
national communist movement as constituting intervention in American
affairs" and declared that "the domination or control of any American
State by the internationalist communist movement, extending to this
hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power . . .
would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of
appropriate action in accord with existing treaties."'" 5
Regardless of the desirability of making a determination in ad-
vance that the emergence of a Communist oriented government in
the hemisphere has been achieved by extra-continental intervention," 6
it nevertheless abridges the principle of nonintervention only to the
extent of authorizing collective action by the OAS.1 7 It is a Monroe
Doctrine for the Americas that shifts the responsibility from the
United States to the republics acting together in joint protective action.
Thus the legal discretion of the United States to act on its own is
not enlarged by the formal hemispheric action condemning the inter-
national communist movement as interventionary. Such condemnation
has been reiterated under the impact of developments in Cuba at
Inter-American conferences by the Declaration of Santiago at Chile
in 1959 and by the Declaration of San Jos6 at Puerto Rico in 1960.118
113 For validity of collective defense concept see Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
quote, supra note 63.
114 Tenth Inter-American Conference, Dep't of State Publication 5692, 8 (1955).
115 Text reprinted in Documents in American Foreign Relations 1954, 412 (1955).
116 See text on the Lima Declaration directed against Germany and Italy in the
World War II period.
117 See Falk, op. cit. supra, note 10 at 181-183.
118 Note relevance of these Declarations to Article 7 of the Rio Treaty calling for
the peaceful settlement of conflicts between States in the hemisphere.
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However, the Latin American republics have not been disposed to
do more than to join in a collective condemnation of the communist
movement. There has been no willingness to change the legal status
of the doctrine of nonintervention or even to join in collective sanc-
tions against governments that have been alleged to be communist-
dominated.
The perception of these limits to the willingness of the Latin
American republics to act against expansions of communist influence
in the hemisphere has increasingly motivated the United States to
resume its role as unilateral actor. Thus the United States is widely
assumed to have taken a decisive interventionary role in the organ-
ization of the revolution that succeeded in overthrowing the pro-
Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954.119 American participation,
although provoking widespread criticism, was handled subtly enough
so that the issue of intervention in violation of treaty obligations
was never sufficiently clear. However, the overtness of the American
role in the fight against Castro makes quite clear the interventionary
character of United States conduct. The absence of collective author-
ization by the OAS is decisive for an evaluation of the legality of the
unilateral help and comfort given the plan of the Cuban Revolutionary
Council to invade Cuban territory to overthrow Castro and of the
economic coercive measures. Regardless of the correctness of the
characterization of the Castro government as "Communist" and as
a virtual member of the Soviet Bloc, such coercive conduct by the
United States amounts clearly to intervention forbidden by Article
15 of the Charter of Bogota (as well as such earlier instruments as
the Additional Protocol on Non-intervention).120
One is led, then, to the inescapable conclusion that the United
States has violated its legal obligations to refrain from intervention
in the internal affairs of Cuba by its use of coercive economic sanc-
tions (especially the export embargo) and by its support for the
hostile military venture of the exiles carried out in April 1961. In
addition, the United States would seem to be flagrantly guilty of violat-
ing its obligation under the Civil Strife Convention to remain aloof in
the face of an internal struggle for power in Latin America. Although
less evident, the United States would seem to have abused the legal
right to confer asylum upon political refugees by allowing the exiles
to form a counter-revolutionary plot on its territory. Furthermore, the
status of United States conduct seems legally dubious in relation to
the United Nations Charter provisions requiring pacific settlement
119 See generally Fenwick, "Jurisdictional Questions Involved in the Guatemalan
Revolution, "48 Am. J. Int'l L. 597 (1954).
120 See text above.
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of disputes and respect for national independence, and quite contra-
dictory to the aspirational Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace
and Security of Mankind that was adopted, with the concurring
vote of the United States member, by the International Law Com-
mission. And finally, the conduct of Americans who helped to finance,
organize, and execute the April invasion plan appears to constitute
a crime under the domestic laws of the United States.
V. A PROVISIONAL ASSESSMENT
What do these events portend for the future of inter-American
relations? It is too early to attempt a real assessment. Even the future
shape of Cuban-American relations remains highly uncertain. An
exchange of tractors for prisoners may not re-establish harmony, but
it provides some hope for a mutual willingness to relax tensions. By
acting as a sponsor for the Cuban rebels the United States received
a political and moral defeat that is not unlike the miscalculation and
setback experienced by England and France in the 1956 Suez Cam-
paign. But the experience can also be of enormous instructive value.
In this regard, I should like to conclude by identifying some of the
problems and challenges illuminated by the relations of the United
States with Cuba since Castro took over in 1959.
(1) There appears, in one sense, to be manifest a remarkable
degree of historical continuity both within Cuba itself and in the
response of the United States to a situation prevailing in a Latin
American neighbor that was destructive of private investment and
antagonistic to our desire to maintain hemispheric political supremacy.
The pattern of Castro's authoritarian government basing itself upon the
strength of his personality is consistent with a tradition of charismatic
leadership deeply embedded in Cuban history since colonial times.'' It
is nothing new for Cuba to be dominated by a dictator who suppresses
cruelly the political opposition, eliminates civil liberties, and controls
mass media of communication for propagandistic purposes. The dif-
ference, from the viewpoint of a free press, between newspapers run
by a reactionary elite friendly to Batista and run by the Castro govern-
ment is not very great. It is quite true that Castro has betrayed the
democratic principles proclaimed as his program in Sierra Maestra
in 1957,122 but, in so doing, he has continued rather than varied the
internal Cuban atmosphere. Castro has brought into power a dictator-
ship from the left. This has destroyed the former middle class, perhaps
121 See generally Fitzgibbon, op. cit. supra, note 2; Tannenbaum, "The Political
Dilemma in Latin America," 38 Foreign Aff. 497 (1960).
122 This argument is made fully in the State Department white paper on Cuba,
see op. cit. supra, note 60.
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irreparably damaging Cuban development, and certainly antagonizing
the moderate group that supported him during his struggle for power.
One does not find many peasants or workers among the Castro exiles,
nor is there much evidence of their disenchantment with Castro. The
element of continuity in the internal political life of Cuba is important
if we are to assess accurately the expectations of the Cuban population.
It is improbable that they will miss liberties that were never possessed.
The hostile action of the Castro government has totally destroyed
the value of the huge private investment by Americans in Cuba and
has brought to an end profitable international trade relations between
the two countries. In addition, Cuba has turned for support increasingly
to the extra-hemispheric political enemies of the United States. The
result has bcen to intrude Communist influence in the affairs of a
Latin American state, threatening our relative power position in the
Cold War. Cuba's success serves as an example to other ambitious
elites throughout Latin America. In addition, Castro was eagerly
willing to export his revolution, thus disrupting internal stability
throughout the Caribbean, 23 displaying a cavalier disregard in his
early months of power for the principle of nonintervention. These
developments illustrate extreme instances of the reasons accounting
for United States intervention in Latin American affairs: (1) political
conditions hostile to American investor interests; (2) the apparent
extension to the hemisphere of the influence of a powerful extra-con-
tinental nation. The United States has responded, except for its failure
to resort to dictatorial interference by force of arms, by recourse to
a policy of "protective intervention." This suggests continuity with
the hegemonial claims asserted by the United States during the later
stages of the Monroe Doctrine. Interposed legal commitments to the
absolute doctrine of nonintervention preclude us, however, from a
revival of the Monroe Doctrine to meet the Sino-Soviet threat without
embarking on a dubious path of explicit law-breaking. We are no
longer free to act unilaterally. 124
(2) The United States concern with the protection of private
investment seems to induce our leadership to confuse socialism with
international communism. The effort of Castro to reconstitute Cuban
society by recourse to a radical and socialistic program must be kept
rigidly separate from considerations relevant to the distribution of
power in the Cold War. Otherwise we dangerously foreclose political
cooperation with socialist societies, undesirably limiting our flexi-
bility in foreign affairs. It is my opinion that a socialist response
123 Cf., Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1959, 353-357 (1960).
124 See Halle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder," The New Republic, June 5, 1961,
13, 15.
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is needed in the less developed parts of the world to hasten a higher
standard of living, a rapid rate of industrialization, and an equitable
distribution of wealth and services to the lower classes. The United
States must encourage such developments so as to promote healthy,
progressive, and stable societies in Latin America. Hence, the apparent
willingness to brand Castro as a "Communist" partly because he ex-
propriated American property is a particularly regressive aspect of
the United States response to Castro.2 5 It almost certainly contributed
pressure upon Castro to seek external support from the Sino-Soviet
bloc. 126 For if the United States withdraws support from a radical
social program 2 1 the national leaders will almost certainly turn
for help to the communist bloc countries. This lesson was first taught
the West by Nasser's reaction to the withdrawal of United States
support for Egypt's Aswan Dam project; Castro has re-instructed
us in this respect. A stable socialist society unaffiliated with either
power bloc is in the interests of the United States in most parts of
the world.
(3) The defeat of the rebel invasion, the reaction of public
opinion throughout Latin America, and the domestic criticism of
United States intervention suggest the political vitality of the legal
commitment to a policy of absolute nonintervention. The sentiment
of the community in Latin America strongly backs the legal norm.
This is a strong argument for adherence to nonintervention by the
United States. It may indicate that our energy should be given over
to the development of effective, compulsory remedies that allow cred-
itor states some opportunity to pursue their claims against debtor
states. The absence of remedies against Cuba certainly contributed
pressure in the direction of intervention. Also considerations of recip-
rocity suggest the mutual benefit of regional stability that may result
for both Cold War rivals if standards of nonintervention become
operational. Khrushchev's message to President Kennedy12 s indicated
the destabilizing effect upon East-West relations that is likely to flow
from an interventionary policy reciprocally pursued against neighboring
hostile states.
125 It is "regressive" because it tends to confuse internal questions of social change
(socialism) with an external power affiliation (communism).
126 In addition, the relative internal strength of the Communist Party was en-
hanced thereby. Fitzgibbon, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 117-118.
127 A "radical social program" is a basic reordering of the society along new lines.
It is not a matter of stabilizing the existing social order by external capital grants. The
United States has used its influence to support reformist rather than radical social
change in Latin America. This policy tends to perpetualize the basic inequities of the
prevailing social orders, especially inequalities in income.
128 Quoted supra at 9.
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(4) Correlated to the vitality of the nonintervention pledge is
the relative insufficiency of the OAS as an organ for the exercise of
collective responsibility. The member states from Latin America are
extremely reluctant to cooperate with the United States in the use
of coercive measures to resist the extension of communist influence
to the hemisphere. Pledges of sentiment can be elicited at inter-Amer-
ican conferences (Caracas, Santiago, and San Jose), but implementing
action is not forthcoming. This is another source of pressure upon the
United States to resort to intervention, despite conflicting legal obli-
gations. The expectation of solidarity-as a substitute for the Monroe
Doctrine-has not materialized as yet in response to communism.
This contrasts with the relative success of collective action, imple-
menting the Declaration of Lima (1938), and designed to resist fascist
infiltration. What alternatives to unilateral intervention are open to
the United States, given its perception that communist control of a
Latin American country imperils significantly its national security?
(5) The United Nations did not seem able to make a legal de-
termination that objectively reflected Cuba's complaints about United
States intervention. The General Assembly passed a mild resolution
urging peaceful settlement of the U.S.-Cuba dispute by recourse to
regional mechanism of adjustment. The force of world condemnation
of interventionary conduct, as potentially expressed in the UN, prob-
ably did restrain the United States from further or more flagrant co-
ercive action. The formal action taken by the General Assembly did not
exhaust its influence over the outcome of the U.S.-Cuban dispute. It
is difficult to assess this, but it is important not to neglect it.
(6) A Latin American leader can mobilize intense public support
by concentrating internal hostility upon the United States. Castro
has had great mass response in his campaign to explain all the defects
of Cuban society by pointing to the great dragon in the north. And
his charismatic following throughout Latin America stems from his
ability to show that the dragon breathes fire but is perhaps made of
paper. Other ambitious Latin American leaders can be expected to
use latent mass hostility to the United States as a lever of political
power.
(7) The emergence of Castro has led the United States to begin
taking seriously the needs of its hemispheric neighbors. The new
relevance of the Cold War to Latin America will probably benefit
many nations through increased participation in foreign aid and loan
programs. The moderate leaders of beneficiary countries must realize
that Castro has made this possible. This may help to account for their
reluctance to use coercion to eliminate Castroism from the hemisphere.
So long as Castro remains, the United States will do a lot to keep its
friends in the hemisphere satisfied.
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(8) There are certain implications of our conduct towards Castro
which, although central to calm understanding, are very difficult to
evaluate. First, the uniform hypocrisy of our highest leaders in their
defense against Cuba's charges that we were contemplating direct
or indirect intervention. The extreme hypocritical gesture was made
in the United Nations by Ambassador Wadsworth when he said that
the United States welcomed information that would enable a strict
enforcement of our neutrality laws at a time when it was evidently
governmental policy to prepare the Castro exiles for the military ex-
pedition that took place in April 1961.129 Such blatent falsification
in solemn diplomatic situations sets a very bad example, especially
in view of the American tendency to speak of action taken to promote
national interests in the self-righteous rhetoric of morality. President
Kennedy's suggestion that our newpapers accept voluntary censorship
is occasion for further alarm in this regard. How can an uninformed
or misinformed society remain democratic? How can we trust our
own leaders? How can other countries trust us? This is a very serious
consequence of the Cuban affair, for the slow development of trust is
indispensable to the growth of all international order, especially in
the crucial area of arms control. Trust is the horizontal alternative
to effective vertical controls.
Second, Cold War pressure has led the United States to act in
disregard of its legal obligations. This is very damaging to our cam-
paign to extend further the relevance of law to international relations.
More specifically, it reveals the political limits of our treaty commit-
ment to the doctrine of absolute nonintervention. This seems likely
to reactivate Latin American suspicions about our willingness to act
as a good neighbor under current world conditions. It may further
threaten hemispheric solidarity.
Third, the Kennedy Doctrine enumerated a unilateral assumption
by the United States of a power that is inconsistent with our legal
obligations. It narrowed our nonintervention pledge down in unwar-
ranted fashion to apply only to direct armed intervention by United
States military forces even though the applicable treaty provisions
are carefully formulated in language broad enough to reach indirect
and non-military forms of intervention. Furthermore, President Ken-
nedy announced a possibility of direct armed intervention in the event
129 E.g., consider this statement made in a U.N. debate by Ambassador Wads-
worth: "It is natural and readily understandable that some Cubans on our shores
should want to engage in activities against the government which has done them so
much harm. But the United Sates has been in no way associated with such activities.
On the contrary, we have made -unusual and special efforts to prevent violations of
our laws.' (emphasis added). Second Statement of January 4, 44 Dep't State Bull.
103 (1961).
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that the OAS fails to discharge its responsibility to implement ef-
fectively the various Declarations of Solidarity designed to keep the
communist movement from extending its influence to our hemisphere.
Finally, President Kennedy and others have suggested that the
exercise of communist influence in the hemisphere is not "negotiable";
this seems to suggest a policy of force which directly conflicts with
our commitments to seek peaceful settlement of all international dis-
putes. Perhaps this is necessary for national security, but we should
at least be clear about the broad destabilizing effect of such a claim.
It is, of course, reciprocally available to our rivals in the Cold War.
Fourth, the role of the CIA raises a number of independently
disturbing problems. It is not reassuring to have our international
intelligence organ act with such ineptitude. The CIA badly directed
the exiles and it disastrously miscalculated the chances of a spontaneous
uprising within Cuba. "It used to be said that you would need an
enemy if you had a Hungarian for a friend, and Senor Castro has by
now concluded that you will never need a friend if you have the CIA
for an enemy.' 130 Unfortunately this is more than a sardonic aside.
The CIA's failure destroys one's confidence in our capacity to assess
military threats that exist or are supposed to exist. This is most
serious today when military security is critically dependent on knowing
when not to push the strike buttons. Additionally, CIA's evident
backing of Batista-oriented exiles is shocking. It is inconsisent with
our frequently reiterated preference for the emergence of liberal
democracy in Latin America, and must make our speeches against
dictatorship sound rather hollow. CIA seems to have acted without a
clear Presidential mandate; it acted without even a clear internal
policy as is suggested by its own split over which exile faction de-
served major support. CIA, virtually on its own, seemed to be com-
mitting the United States to a very unpopular, dubiously conceived,
and disastrously executed policy of counter-revolution in a foreign
nation. One is disturbed that such a record has generated so little
domestic criticism or concern. One notes the contrast to the wide-
spread opposition in England that arose in 1956 after British par-
ticipation in the Sinai Campaign was made public.
CONCLUSION
The United States response to the challenge of Castro has been
awkward and lawless. It has uncovered a number of dubious assump-
tions that our policy-makers have used as the basis of our international
conduct. It provides, therefore, an excellent opportunity for a reform-
ulation of the relevance of law to politics, and a recommitment by
130 Talk of the Town, New Yorker, May 13, 1961, 31-32.
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the United States to the rule of law in hemispheric affairs. The pressure
of the Cold War need not cripple our capacity to act as a nation in
accord with our traditional fidelity to law. But we must come to
understand that the restraints of law often serve our national interest,
even when they protect a government as hostile to our welfare as is
Castro. The world may not have much time left in which to establish
an effective world law. So we must use what time is given to us in a
responsible fashion. This is the deepest teaching of the failure of the
United States response to the troublesome challenge thrown at us
by Castro's Cuba. Perhaps we can learn this from pondering the cry
of the impassioned Havana mobs: "Patria o muerte."
